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Zusammenfassung
Obwohl die Machtkonstellation im Ostseeraum nach dem Ende des Kalten
Krieges einer Politik der gemeinsamen Sicherheit förderlich zu sein
versprach, bestehen weiterhin Uneinigkeiten. Die neuen Trennlinien folgen
dabei weder dem Muster des Kalten Krieges noch dem der Vorkriegszeit.
Dieser Artikel analysiert die Bedeutung der USA für die regionale Sicherheit
im Ostseeraum aus der Sicht der Staaten der Region. Dabei vertritt er die
These, dass das Auseinandergehen der sicherheitspolitischen Ansichten
gerade der jeweils unterschiedlichen Bewertung der Rolle der USA
entspringt, die als Haupt-Seemacht überragende Präsenz zeigen, während
die traditionellen Landmächte Deutschland und Russland diesen Status
verloren haben.
Håken R. Nilson ist verantwortlich für das Großbritannien-Programm
am Europa-Programmet, Oslo.
1. Int roduct ion:  T he US and Post-Cold War Secur ity in
the Balt ic  Sea Region
Since the emergence of independent Nordic and Baltic states in the
beginning of this century, their foreign and security political orientations have
basically differed, despite many shared interests. In the years following
World War I, they sought different allies or chose different directions of
neutrality. That led them to finding themselves in dramatically different or
even adverse positions during the Second World War. The post-war period
started with efforts to find a common ground for security in the region.
However, these efforts soon broke down under the strains of the escalating
Cold War. Instead they became replaced by new, dividing security political
alignments. As this situation ended around 1990, the preconditions for all to
enter into security political solutions based on commonly shared interests
and values were soon expected to have become as favourable as never
before in this century.
Throughout history, the actions and the influence of the great powers in and
around the region have been formative for the orientations and interests of
the smaller regional states. The present situation is marked by a lack of
exertion of influence by the two traditional land powers Russia and Germany.
Neither is currently claiming strong positions in the region. The main Western
maritime power, the US is now the only power that has the capacity to
project its power to the entire region. The significance of the US for security
in the region has thus changed profoundly, as compared to during the Cold
War. The Nordic states have, on their part, increased their influence and
vested interests in the Baltic States to an extent that they have not held
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considerably.
The analysis is limited to those states whose main security concerns are
connected to the Baltic Sea. These are the three Nordic EU states, to some
degree Norway, and the three Baltic States. Considering Poland and
Germany, who both possess a coastline on the Baltic Sea, these are powers
that are also capable of projecting power on to the region from an external
position. They will therefore not be regarded as belonging to the regional
subsystem in the same way as the Nordic and the Baltic States. Rather,
Poland and Germany appear as strong external actors whose interests in
the region relate to their interests as Central European states. The group of
states that act as internal players in regional security will be termed “the
regional states”. Those states that may project their power on to the region
on the basis of their position outside the region will be termed “external
powers”. Russia will, for practical reasons, be regarded as an external
power in the current analysis.
In the analysis of the individual states’ own perceptions about how the US is
significant to their security in the Baltic Sea context, a distinction will be
made between the concepts that are employed for analytical reasons (e.g.
“multilateral cooperation”), and political concepts relating to the actors’ own
priorities and perspectives. When employing this actor oriented perspective,
statements of the governments of the regional states will be commented
from an analytical point of view. The analytical concepts are used to
structure the discussion of the latter.
The time period that has been chosen, is roughly the period 1995–2000. By
2000, plans for a European autonomous defence appeared to have become
credible enough to raise new challenges to the US as a provider of security
in the region that could lead to the setting of still new priorities. The selected
period provides for the availability of extensive source material, with regard
to the country perspectives, primarily reports from national defence
committees to the parliaments. It also limits the post-1990 period to a time
when the basic assessments of the new situation had been made, and it
closes the period at a moment in European relations that may set off still
new substantial changes.
2. T hree Approaches to Regional Secur ity
In the situation that emerged in the Baltic Sea Region after the Cold War,
security got a more differentiated meaning than during the Cold War bipolar
situation. At that time, security was generally thought of in terms of national
security political interests that were ultimately to be secured by military
means. To this “realist” understanding of security was later added a different
understanding, that security could be best achieved by emphasising the
common nature of universal interests such as stability, democracy,
institutional development. These aims were to be reached by means of a
broader political and economic cooperation.
The latter approach to security combines traditional military security with
broader cooperative arrangements, and is commonly termed “cooperative
security”.1 The two approaches put different emphasis on, respectively,
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unilateralism and interdependence, as paths to security. In Baltic Sea
politics, the US seems relevant to both approaches to security. As to military
security, the US is relevant mainly in its capacity as the lead country in
NATO, but also with respect to bilateral arrangements. As to the
“cooperative” approach, the US is relevant with respect to political and
economic support to and engagement in non-military cooperative activities.
As a third approach, regional states are pursuing individual regional
strategies for their security. In their individual strategies, the US can be
assigned different roles. These brief references to current thinking about
security have been made in order to describe different understandings.
Rather than being applied here in order to offer explanations about the
states and their priorities, they will be used in order to establish the
analytical concepts that will structure the further discussion.
Mi l i t ar y  Secur i t y  in  t he Pos t -Co ld  War  Bal t ic  Sea Reg ion
During the 1990’s, military security in the Baltic Sea context has in principle
become attainable for all states through NATO either by full membership or
by cooperative arrangements, or by bilateral arrangements with the USA.
Military security is attainable either through a direct security guarantee, or by
ways of “cooperative security”. The direct security guarantee can either be
pursued through collective defence, or through bilaterally agreed security
guarantees. Military security by cooperative arrangements is attainable in
various forms, ranging from cooperative arrangements with/within NATO, to
bi- or multilateral military cooperation with various actors.
The most comprehensive arrangement for collective defence is laid in Article
5 of the North Atlantic treaty. Institutional changes in the alliance have given
states in the region possibilities to make links with the alliance without
entering into full membership. The Partnership for peace (PfP) arrangement
was created in 1994. Within this arrangement, NATO’s member states
cooperate with a number of other states with the aim of increasing the ability
of the NATO and Partnership countries to handle crisis management
operations. In addition, in 1997 the NATO and Partnership countries
established the common Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). EAPC is
a political framework for PfP and a forum for consultations between NATO
and the Partnership countries. Collective defence is giving way to
“cooperative security”.
The Broader  Reg ional  Cooperat ion :  Mu l t i lat eral
Ins t i t u t ions  and Reg ional  Net works
The broader approach to regional security involves a partly different set of
institutions. Multilateral organisations such as the EU, the OSCE and the UN
catch the main attention of most of the regional states when seeking means
to stabilise the conditions for social and economic development. The US is
committed to some of the activities these organisations undertake, by means
of political and financial support.
The Baltic Sea Region may in many ways be regarded as a “micro-cosmos”
of the transformation of Europe from cold war division to post cold war
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strategies: the formation of an integrated Baltic Sea Region in itself, and the
incorporation of this region in the larger European system of political,
economic and military cooperation. As for the role of the US in this
connection, Washington has issued numerous political signals about support
for various policies and development paths. Outgoing from a selective
approach to engagement in Baltic Sea affairs, the US has, however, rather
encouraged the regional states themselves to take on responsibilities for the
region.
Through active participation in regional organisations, the US has become
broadly embedded in regional cooperation. This engagement has been
greatly welcomed by all regional states concerned, being generally seen as
a contribution to the embedding of the Nordic-Baltic area in the wider
Euro-Atlantic security cooperation.2
From the European side, the European Union takes part in Baltic Sea
cooperation as an organisational framework, and as a participating actor as
well. It is engaged in a wide range of integrative and cooperative policies
that aim to stabilise the social development of the region. The European
Union is now an important framework for multilateral cooperation policies for
Finland and Sweden, the non-aligned Nordic states. Also for the Baltic
States, the EU has acquired similar significance, however more in terms of a
realisable option for achieving a minimum of multilaterally based security,
than full NATO membership.
A Council on the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) was set up in 1992, meeting
bi-annually at ministerial level. This is a loose organisation with no strong
mandate to take action. However, it works as a meeting place for the
governments and heads of state. In addition, there is at sub-state level a
vivid networking that transcends the borders within numerous cooperative
activities. Regional cooperation at state level has got its prime institutional
expression in the CBSS.
St rat eg ies  f o r  r eg ional  in f luence
The withdrawal of the traditional land power Russia, together with a sensitive
and cautious approach of Germany3 and the moderate interest among the
Atlantic powers for Baltic Sea affairs, has greatly changed the conditions for
the Nordic states as actors in the Baltic Sea region. During most of the past
two centuries, the Nordic countries have largely been subject to great power
dominance in the region. A majority of them chose defensive alliances with
these powers respectively, and to little extent played active roles in regional
security politics in their own capacities. For the Baltic States, possibilities to
integrate with the Nordic states at all, first came back within reach during the
1990’s. These possibilities have been tried exploited by them as leverage for
closer relations with NATO.
Currently, there seems to be more room for the regional states to play roles
in Baltic Sea security in their capacities as individual state actors in regional
politics. However, most of them have only to a small degree responded to
the new opportunities. Their priorities have either been to seek continued or
new great power protection, or to pursue varieties of their policy orientations
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the 1990’s began to exploit the new opportunities to play a more active role
as a regional player in security affairs.4 In a situation where there still seems
to be a large room for active pursuance of national ambitions, the
significance of the US for their security may be different, depending on the
kind of security that is sought and in what context, and it may also be relative
to other sources of security.
3. Dif ferent  Perspect iv es  on the Signif icance of  the US
Depending on which of the three approaches to regional security that apply,
the US may play different roles in regional security. In addition, the regional
states may diverge in the role they prefer that the US play. Four different
perceptions of what role the US should play in regional security will be
discussed below.
Pr ov ider  o f  a d ir ec t  secur i t y  guarant ee
The eastward expansion of NATO, together with the partnership
arrangements that the non-member regional states have all entered into,
turns the Baltic Sea more into a “NATO sea”.5 NATO’s expansion has been
carried out against strong expression of discontent from Russia, in spite of a
wide range of measures aiming at appeasing and including Russia in certain
NATO structures. It has proved difficult to gain Russia’s confidence for the
Western powers’ assertion that the challenge is to include Russia in
cooperative security arrangements for the region. Consequently, the states
in the region more or less continue to consider Russia as a potential threat,
thus making the US relevant as a possible provider of direct security
guarantees.
Balanc ing  t he r eg ional  land power s
Since the end of the Napoleonic wars, the smaller countries in the Baltic Sea
region, notably the Nordic states, have been components of a “sub-regional
state system within the European concerts of great powers”.6 As such, they
have largely been recipients of security provided through alliances with
external great powers. Through the Cold War, this was true to some degree
even for the neutral states Finland and Sweden, who respectively either
arranged its neutrality in accordance with the interests of one of the external
powers, or made hidden arrangements with external powers, that were
concealed from official neutrality.
NATO's expansion may change the perspectives of the regional states on
where security may be acquired. By the entry of Poland into the alliance, the
Central European component of Baltic Sea security could be anticipated to
grow in importance, and most likely develop around Poland and Germany.
Balancing of the German land power will therefore be required both for the
regional states, as well as from the viewpoint of the maritime powers and
Russia as well.
In military security, the US has a role to play for all regional states, however
to different extents and in different forms. It is the only external actor
capable of projecting power onto the entire region. In this capacity, the US is
able to counterbalance other powers competing in the region. A
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of balancing German and Russian interests in the region, even if neither of
them presently hold strong political ambitions or are capable to project
significant power onto the region themselves.
In the perspective that has been drawn up above, the US may be
strategically important to the smaller states as a balancer between the land
powers. Through its NATO membership, Germany remains militarily
integrated, thus abating traditional needs for establishing its own security
arrangements in the region. By the presence of the alliance, possible
Russian ambitions about re-establishing its former interest spheres, are
contained.
Par t ic ipant  in  b roader  r eg ional  cooperat ion
The US may have different significance to the regional states in this context
than in the context of military security. The regional Baltic Sea cooperation is
as well an entirely different setting, in which the regional states have slightly
different strategic aims for attracting Washington's attention. Especially
Norway with its concern for the Northern areas on the one hand, and the
Baltic States on the other, seem to differ most clearly from the three other
Nordic states in this respect.
Mi l i t ar y  p ro t ec t ion  as  a f oundat ion  f o r  r eg ional  ambit ions
The significance of the US differs depending on the particular ambitions the
states hold in the regional competition. It appears as if for two countries
only, Finland and Norway, the US has about the same kind of significance as
an equaliser of potential influence exerted by the two main land powers,
Germany and Russia. For the other regional states, the US appears, as has
been seen, important in more diverse ways.
Support for regional states’ ambitions would mean to provide capabilities for
a regional state to pursue goals and strategies that would not be attainable
without such support. For the regional states, such capabilities would
basically refer to binding security guarantees. None of the regional states
have followed up the American encouragement to take on any particular
responsibilities for regional security. Only Denmark seems to have benefited
to any considerable extent from the possibilities that thus became open for
advancing a more active role in Baltic Sea security. In such respect, the US
seems to be of only moderate significance to the other states.
Interestingly, no other state has neither supported nor seriously challenged
Denmark. Rather on the contrary, Sweden was in a position to develop
regional leadership as it was encouraged to respond to the signals from
Washington, but the Swedish government appears to have refrained from
pursuing such an option. Sweden’s position outside NATO may have
deprived it of a sufficient framework for asserting a regional role effectively.
Instead, Sweden’s social democratic government has in a more general
language reiterated the importance of retaining the region in the transatlantic
security system. In line with this, there is a strong support for the
participation of the US in regional institutions, aiming at counteracting the











1. Introduction: The US and Po
2. Three Approaches to Regiona
Military Security in the Post-
The Broader Regional Cooperati
Strategies for regional influe
3. Different Perspectives on t
Provider of a direct security
Balancing the regional land po
Participant in broader regiona
Military protection as a found
4. The post Cold War strategic
Denmark: The front line that m
Finland: Permanently on the bo
Sweden: Closer to the “ instabi
Norway: An Atlantic state in t
The Baltic States: Between the
5. Security Political Prioriti
Military Security through alli
Broader multilateral security
Competing political strategies
6. Converging and diverging pe
Russia as the main potential t
Only the US is capable of proj
The region's connection to the
Russia as a security challenge
NATO’s eastward expansion




NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Håken R. Nilson
The regional states may thus have different preferences, or leanings, with
regard to their preferences for a role for the US in regional security. Their
respective leanings are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Significance of the US in regional security, by country
US a support for regional ambitions
and counterweight to the land powers
US a balancer of the
regional land powers






The table shows that the traditional pattern of diverging foreign and security
political orientations among the regional states seems to have survived the
Cold War. However, the current pattern has developed along other lines than
it had before 1990. In the next section, the post Cold War strategic situation
that has developed for each of the states, will be discussed as a background
for the way the current pattern has developed.
4. T he post  Cold War s t rategic  s ituat ion of  the regional
s tates
The Nordic and the Baltic states are all searching for a new basis for
security in the region. The kind of arrangements they regard as desirable,
possible and feasible outgo from the way they view their changed security
environment in the region. In the following, their respective perspectives will
be commented.
Denmark :  The f r on t  l ine t hat  moved Eas t
What has first of all affected Denmark’s geopolitical position in the region is
that the old East-West frontline has moved away from Denmark’s immediate
vicinity at the Baltic Sea inlets, and to the Eastern end of the Baltic Sea. At
the same time, no other confrontation lines have replaced it in the region.
This has left Denmark in a new kind of situation as compared with the
preceding 100 years, in which various degrees of foreign military threat to
Danish territory was the structuring factor in Denmark’s security policy.8
Reflecting the new situation, the Danish Government’s Defence Commission
states in its report to Parliament that it does not see any “direct conventional
military threats to Denmark's security” estimated to appear within a 10 year
perspective outgoing from 1997.9
From having rather passively sought collective security in NATO in the
position of a frontline state, the Danish government’s line of policy has
changed into playing an active role in security matters in its own capacity10,
from a position well behind the NATO frontier. In this connection, the former
“Nordic track”11 in Danish foreign policy has become replaced by a “Nordic-
Baltic” track.12 According to government statements, the leading security
political objective has become “stabilization” of the post-Cold War pattern in
the Nordic-Baltic sub-region.13
These changes have by many been interpreted as motivated by ambitions of
becoming a lead actor in regional security.14 A logical requirement has been
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Such assets include active participation in NATO operations outside NATO’s
area, defence cooperation with the Baltic states, and participation in regional
NATO arrangements, most notably the Danish-German-Polish NATO
corps.16 The new, more active role is to be played within the framework of
NATO, together with relevant NATO actors, primarily Poland and Germany,
and in close partnership with the US.
Fin land:  Per manent ly  on  t he border
Even though Finland’s immediate security environment has changed radically,
the Finnish government’s main security political concerns in many ways
remain similar to those of the Cold War. Paradoxically, however, the policy
response has been that of a thorough restructuring of the foreign and
security policy. The reason for this is of course, that though Russia remains
a particular concern due to the long common border, the geopolitical context
is otherwise largely new.
During the Cold War years, the most serious threat was conceived as
Finland’s territory becoming exploited in a great power confrontation.
Whereas this risk is now seen as having diminished, the Finnish
government’s opinion is that Europe’s Northern sea, air and land areas
continue to maintain their strategic significance for Russia and the relations
between the great powers.17 At the same time, as Russia’s formerly
forward positions in the Baltic Sea have been abandoned (with the exception
of Kaliningrad), the strategic importance of Russia’s naval forces in the Gulf
of Finland has increased relatively.18
Along with these changes, the front-line between Russia and the West has
moved eastward, closer to Finland. This means that the prime areas of
instability in the Baltic Sea region to a greater extent than during the Cold
War are close to Finland. While NATO’s possibilities for action in the region
have been expanded eastwards, Russia’s have contracted correspondingly.
At the same time, Russian military forces are now concentrated stronger in
Finland’s immediate vicinity. The Western border areas remain of vital
importance to Russia both economically and militarily. A serious aspect of
this is the relatively increased importance of nuclear weapons due to the
deterioration of Russia’s conventional forces, which paradoxically may make
Finland’s military situation become more sensitive the more relaxed the
overall security situation in the region becomes.19
Sweden:  Closer  t o  t he “ ins t ab i l i t y  zone”
Also Sweden’s geopolitical position has moved closer to the “zone of
instability” in the eastern Baltic Sea region, as well as to the new potential
confrontation line between East and West. However, Sweden’s security has
become less affected by this than Finland’s. Three factors stand now as
focal points for the Swedish ministry of foreign affairs’ assessments of
Sweden’s security in the Baltic Sea region: Russia, Poland and the Baltic
States.20
The first of these factors is that Russia is no longer considered a direct
threat to Sweden’s territorial integrity, but rather a threat to stability in the
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emphasise “special interests” in the Baltic States has led to the conclusion
that there is a danger of confrontational incidents in the Eastern Baltic
Sea.21 The second factor is that the strategic situation to the south of
Sweden has greatly improved. Poland’s membership in NATO implies a new
strategic situation immediately south of Sweden, and Germany has got a
large new allied state at its Eastern border.
The third factor has to do with how the strategic situation of the three Baltic
States could affect Finland, and thereby Sweden. Apart from constituting a
large part of the “instability zone” in the eastern Baltic, they affect Sweden’s
security in more indirect ways. Since Estonia has a direct strategic
significance for Finland by way of its vicinity to the Helsinki area, a threat to
Finland here would worsen Finland’s capacity to defend its Eastern border.
For such reasons, a threat to a Baltic State, and to Estonia in particular,
could be thus motivate a quick Finnish move towards NATO membership.
Direct threats to the Baltic states could also be met with Western attempts
to restrict Russian logistical links at the Baltic Sea outlets or at Kaliningrad.
Such incidents would certainly increase tensions in Sweden’s near
environment.
Norway :  An At lant ic  s t at e in  t he Bal t ic  Sea Region
The Baltic Sea region basically affects Norway’s security through its location
at the inlets to the Baltic Sea. Historically, this has motivated every
Norwegian government since 1814 to seeking avoid war with the maritime
powers. In the present situation, with no acute confrontation between the
maritime powers and any of the land powers, Norway’s strategic situation in
the region has improved. It is rather the Eastern parts and the connections
with Northern security issues that are of prime concern.
Due to the strong Norwegian security concerns in the Northern areas, Baltic
Sea security in the traditional Norwegian foreign political perspective is seen
as connected to Northern security – as a means of raising the awareness of
Norway’s allies and Nordic neighbours of Norwegian security concerns in the
north. Instability in the relations between the Baltic States and Russia would
have immediate impact on Norway’s security.
Sweden and Finland’s joining the European Union are important
developments that are considered to greatly affect Norway’s strategic
situation both in the Baltic and the Northern areas.22 The memberships of
Finland and Sweden create a new foundation for Nordic cooperation, and for
cooperation between the Nordic and the Baltic states. Since Sweden and
Finland have involved themselves far more with the security political
cooperation in Europe, the Nordic dimension in Norway’s security and
defence policies have become more important. The connections that
Sweden, Finland and the Baltic States have established with NATO have
offered Norway a possibility to cooperate with them and the US within a
common security political framework.
In addition to these more basic post-Cold War security problem, Norway’s
situation is conceived as being constituted by the decreased significance of
Norwegian land territory for the defence of Western Europe. In order to
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as crisis management operations have been regarded as strategic means.
On the other hand, the situation in the Northern areas call for a security
guarantee for Norway of a traditional kind. Norway has thus become one of
the few members of the alliance that still emphasises the concept of
collective defence for the Alliance, and is increasingly considering bilateral
cooperation with the US as well as other central allies.23
The Bal t ic  St at es :  Bet ween t he Nord ic  communit y  and t he
lar ger  West
Among the many challenges facing the three Baltic States, fear of Russian
military aggression has ranked on top of the “hierarchy of threats”. Other
possible threats to the state as well as the possibilities for subversive
activities on the part of the large Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia,
have been connected to the perceived threat.24 Confusion and insecurity
about the possibilities for the Baltic States to enter the EU and NATO as full
members has further added to the insecurity about what kind of protection
these countries actually might expect from the outside world.
In their search for protection by states and organisations in their Western
environment, the Baltic States have approached the Nordic countries just as
they have approached EU, NATO, individual European powers, and the US.
The Nordic response has been both accommodating and limited. On the part
of military support, the Nordic states have contributed with a broad range of
supportive means, such as donations of (often obsolete but still working)
military and infrastructural hardware, training and education, and other kinds
of cooperative schemes.
Even though the Nordic states have taken the lead in assisting the Baltics,
they have set clear limitations. Whatever support and assistance there is
given, it should specifically aim at, and be restricted to, strengthening of the
sovereignty of the Baltic states, their ability to enforce their sovereignty by
their own means25, and enhancing their ability to participate in international
operations. In military affairs, cooperation with the Nordic states is aimed at
enabling the Baltic states to take part in international activities such as
peacekeeping and Partnership for Peace activities. While the main thrust is
laid upon Nordic-Baltic cooperation, the Baltic states have become
connected to larger powers through these arrangements. For example, the
Baltic battalion, BALTBAT, was established and trained by the Nordic states
and the Untied Kingdom. The Nordic-Polish brigade deployed in the IFOR
force in Bosnia in 1996 contained contributions from the Baltic states.
The Nordic states may in this way have wanted to share their responsibilities
with partners of more weight in European security. The result for the Baltic
states seems to be that they have ended up in a middle position between
Nordic and European/Atlantic connections in which neither have been willing
to take on the kind of responsibilities that the Baltic states have been aiming
at.
The recent entry of Poland into NATO has instigated one of the Baltic states,
Lithuania, to seek closer security political relations with Poland and
Germany, an orientation that is less to be expected on the part of Estonia
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comparatively closer to the community of Nordic states in security matters,
the former might turn itself more towards Central Europe. The development
of the Baltic States’ security political orientations during the 1990’s may in
this way illustrate their strategic position as somewhat in an empty space
between the Nordic states and the West.
As seen in the previous section, the strategic situation has changed in both
absolute and relative terms for all the regional states during the post Cold
War years. Their changed strategic situation gives rise to revision or renewal
of old security political priorities.
5. Secur ity Polit ical Pr ior it ies
The way these relate to the three principal approaches to security,
mentioned in section 2, will be the issue in this section.
Mi l i t ar y  Secur i t y  t h rough al l iance commit ment
Collective defence and cooperative security are both aspects of military
security. All the regional states, with the possible exception of Denmark,
seem to give priority to either one over the other.
Finland and Sweden, as well as the Baltic States, build their main military
security foundations on national defence in combination with cooperative
security arrangements in the region. The traditional Finnish security political
solution was to stay out of alliances and maintain an independent, strong
national defence. During the 1990s, cooperative activities, even with NATO,
became added. In the program of the Finnish government that was elected
in March 1999, the term “alliance freedom” was omitted.26 This step logically
increases the space for expanding the scope of military security
arrangements, if so desired. The question remains, however, of where to
seek firm security guarantees. Currently, Finland’s position still seems to be
composed of a Western orientation mainly through EU and Nordic-Baltic
engagements on the one hand, and the maintenance of a good relationship
with Russia on the other, meaning a continuation of alliance freedom27, but
now on a new, multilateral basis.
Neutrality was defined differently in Finland and Sweden during the Cold
War. Afterwards, their governments seem to assess the significance of
NATO and the transatlantic links of the Baltic Sea Region somewhat
differently. The Finnish government moved faster to carry out a complete
redefinition of its priorities than that of Sweden, who has longer been sticking
to the notion of “neutrality” as a guiding principle for its foreign policy.
Entering a direct alliance with the US still proves a difficult choice for both,
however, given foreign political concerns (Finland) or domestic political ones
(Sweden). At the same time, there are signs that there is a desire for a
closer connection to NATO at political level in both countries. For example,
Finland’s participation in PfP and its near compliance with NATO’s
interoperability criteria, appear to have been undertaken also with a view to
preparedness for receiving Western military assistance.28 Sweden, like
Finland having moved into PfP, continues, however, to appear as more
uncertain about its further intentions regarding NATO. A likely explanation
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as contrary to Russian interests, would endanger the Finnish and Swedish
long-term policy of staying out of conflicts and pursuing regional stability.29
NATO’s stronger emphasis on “cooperative security” to supplement the
traditional collective defence may have made the alliance more interesting
and less problematic for Finland and Sweden. Basically, however, the Finnish
government seems to prefer to maintain Finland’s alliance freedom in
combination with a strong national territorial defence.
On the part of Sweden, fresh signals have been given in repeated
statements that the government sees the transatlantic link as an important
component of regional security. In the Swedish as well as in the Finnish
government’s perspective, US presence in the Baltic Sea Region is wanted
in particular as a means of maintaining links to the Central European region.
They both reject the idea that security in Europe should become decoupled,
something which would leave them with greater responsibilities in the
Nordic/Baltic context. Both countries emphasise the necessity of US
participation for NATO to be able to fulfill its role as a stabilising element in
European and Baltic Sea security.30
The Swedish government has also made it clear that it favours a broad US
participation in a wide range of Baltic Sea regional institutions, as additional
means of counteracting security political decoupling of the Nordic-Baltic
area.31 This could mean that a further multilateralisation of Baltic Sea
security relations beyond regional institutional politics, is the long-term
objective for Finland’s as well as for Sweden’s government.32 In this
perspective, it could be a concern to counteract e.g. the development of a
NATO sub-region becoming formed around Germany together with Poland
and Denmark.
The current Swedish military security foundation appears as a loose
combination of a radically reduced national defence and continued neutrality
on the one hand, and participation in the cooperative schemes with NATO,
on the other. This arrangement leaves Sweden with a certain room of
manoeuvre in regional affairs, while at the same time carrying with it a
possible implicit security guarantee from the alliance, as well as important
transatlantic links.
The Baltic States, on their part, have long sought military security solutions
by membership in NATO and by bilateral US guarantees. However, the only
realistic option so far has been to enter into various bilateral arrangements
with NATO and with the Nordic countries. Consequently, their range of
realisable options is limited by external factors. While some form of direct
security guarantee remains the preferred option, cooperative security
remains as the maximum attainable possibility.
A major concern for the Danish government would be to avoid a situation
that leaves large room for European great powers to engage in Baltic Sea
regional affairs. Consequently, the Baltic Sea region has to be kept tightly
connected to NATO structures. To this end, Denmark supports full
membership in NATO and EU of the three Baltic States, as well as a high










1. Introduction: The US and Po
2. Three Approaches to Regiona
Military Security in the Post-
The Broader Regional Cooperati
Strategies for regional influe
3. Different Perspectives on t
Provider of a direct security
Balancing the regional land po
Participant in broader regiona
Military protection as a found
4. The post Cold War strategic
Denmark: The front line that m
Finland: Permanently on the bo
Sweden: Closer to the “ instabi
Norway: An Atlantic state in t
The Baltic States: Between the
5. Security Political Prioriti
Military Security through alli
Broader multilateral security
Competing political strategies
6. Converging and diverging pe
Russia as the main potential t
Only the US is capable of proj
The region's connection to the
Russia as a security challenge
NATO’s eastward expansion




NORDEUROPAforum | Artikel | Håken R. Nilson
The importance of the US to Danish security policy has therefore not
diminished. Partnership with the US in regional security affairs continues as a
cornerstone in Denmark’s regional security policy. Its military security
priorities combines cooperative security as a means of strengthening
Denmark’s influence in regional security with a traditional security guarantee
through the membership in the alliance. Together, they are meant to work as
a security political balancing of German influence in Denmark’s security
political environment.
Concerning the Norwegian government’s security political priorities for the
Baltic Sea, these appear as the clear exception from the commonplace
patterns of multilateralism and alliance commitment. The Norwegian
government’s primary priority still emphasises collective defence, which in
spite of a heated debate continues to rank clearly over cooperative security.
Also, the way the emphasis is put on the transatlantic link is different. Again,
the Danish emphasis on the US as a support for wider regional policies
makes an illustrating contrast to Norwegian priorities of maintaining an
American security political guarantee of a more traditional Cold War type.
Broader  mul t i lat er al  secur i t y  cooperat ion
Both with regard to the EU and to the US, the priorities of the regional states
diverge. The main patterns of priorities concerning the EU in regional
multilateral cooperation, is a diverted attention to the Northern areas and the
Baltic Sea Region on the part of Finland and Norway, and a concentration on
the Baltic Sea proper on the part of Denmark and Sweden. Concerning the
Baltic States, these seem to form a converging group in the sense that the
EU has somewhat become a forced priority in lack of credible access to
firmer security arrangements.
With regard to the US, priorities diverge along a different pattern. From the
point of view of the Finnish and Swedish governments, dialogue must be
maintained between all states in the region, and military alliances should play
no major role.34 This plays into their common view that security in the region
must be indivisible – hence, alliances that would alienate Russia from the
other states in the region, will not be favoured. Instead, a strong EU that
promotes trade and integration and involves Russia, along with regional
cooperation that includes Russia on an equal basis, such as the Council of
the Baltic Sea States, is supportive to Finnish and Swedish priorities.
Denmark, Sweden and Finland are acting within the same institutional
frameworks, in their capacity as full EU members. However, there are
differences in security political concerns that they pursue in the EU context.
The main difference seems to be between Finnish concerns on the one hand,
and Swedish and Danish concerns on the other. For the purpose of drawing
EU attention to the Baltic Sea Region and further north, the “Northern
Dimension” of the EU was launched by Finland in 1997. This is an initiative
calling for stronger EU participation in practical cooperation, thus extending
EU’s focus upon Northwest Russia.
The Swedish and Danish governments pay less attention to the Northern
areas than to the “Baltic Sea region proper”. Both countries’ governments
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Baltic States. In the Baltic Sea context, it is the Swedish government’s view
that the EU will have security political significance as well.35 The EU could
therefore rank well above the engagement of the US as an arena for the
Swedish government’s policies for stabilising the region. On the part of
Denmark, while fully integrated in NATO, the Danish government would tend
to see the role of the EU in the region more as a supplement to the security
that Denmark is granted by the USA.
Non-EU member Norway seems to parallel Finland in sharing concern for the
engagement of the EU in Northern affairs. However, also in this case there
are divergences, while the converging concerns are paradoxically promoted
through competing projects – the Northern Dimension and the Barents
Region. This is again related to the NATO question. One of the Norwegian
government’s motives for launching the Barents Region initiative in 1992 was
to build a multilateral arrangement that could soften the diminishing attention
that the alliance was already giving to the area – in case Norway would not
become a member of the EU.36 It is strategically important for Norway to
exert influence in regional security politics also in the multilateral cooperation
area, for the purpose of being able to mesh into processes in the region in
which the EU is among the major participants. Although the EU is out of
reach as a policy arena, its accessibility for Norwegian policy inputs to
regional security usually goes via the Nordic EU states.
The Finnish government has signalised that it considers the EU as a major
provider of multilateral cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. With regard to
the Northern Dimensions initiative, Finnish diplomacy seems to have
outdistanced Sweden and Denmark considerably with a consistent, proactive
policy at EU level for its immediate security environment. The gains in
security that are perceived to come out of this, are twofold: to engage
Russia in the larger European political process, and to contribute to a cross-
border process of consultation and negotiation between all states in the
Baltic Sea Region – as well as in the Barents Region.37
The Swedish and Danish governments, in comparison, seem to downplay the
EU for regional purposes, emphasising Baltic Sea regional cooperation as
well as OSCE policies for the purpose of regional multilateral cooperation
instead. In the priorities of these two countries, the EU appears more as an
important framework for the stabilisation of the Baltic states and Russia,
than as an explicit arena for their own roles in Baltic Sea politics.
The Baltic states, while still applicant countries to the EU, have through
government statements signalised that they regard the EU as being of
secondary importance to the military security guarantees that could be
offered by NATO.38 However, through the application and negotiation
process with the EU, fundamental developments in their legislative and
administrative systems have been carried out, which are also necessary to
ensure eligibility for membership in NATO.
The pattern of multilateral cooperation priorities among the regional states
thus seems to follow two main lines. The first is to stronger emphasise the
participation of the US as a partner in regional multilateral cooperation. This
line is followed by Denmark and Sweden, as well as the three Baltic states.
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of Washington’s encouraging of them to take a greater deal of the
responsibility for regional security.
The other line is to put less emphasis to the US as an actor in Baltic Sea
multilateral cooperation. Norway and Finland, with their governments paying
particular regard to the Northern areas, tend to pursue this line. For these
two states it has become important to exploit the various arenas that offer
viable opportunities to link together regional politics in the northern areas and
the Baltic Sea region. For that purpose, the EU and regional cooperation
seem to rank somewhat higher among their priorities than what seems to be
the case for Danish and Swedish priorities.
Compet ing po l i t ical  s t r at eg ies  f or  r eg ional  in f luence
In the more relaxed, but also more unpredictable security environment in
Europe at large, the room for manoeuvre in security affairs has increased for
the regional states. At the same time, the uncertainty about the implications
of each other’s choices has increased. The main response so far has been
to abstain from taking on individual responsibilities for regional security. The
motivation behind only modestly exploiting the new room to manoeuvre
appears to be twofold – to refrain from formulating conflicting positions, and
to avoid the connections to the transatlantic security system becoming too
loose.
Maintaining a US engagement in regional security therefore seems to rank
as a common interest superior to regional competition. However, certain
competition has still grown out of the relaxation of the earlier great power
restraint upon the regional states, however without the transatlantic
connections having been put at risk. Instead, they rather seem to become
more or less cleverly exploited. In particular, the Danish government's
strategy of “regional activism” distinguishes Denmark from the other regional
states. The Norwegian government, on its part, holds low ambitions along
such lines, but has strong interests in using Baltic Sea Regional security to
raise awareness about the Northern areas.
In Finland’s regional security policy, there are two main strategic objectives:
To pay due attention to Russian concerns, and to counteract de-coupling of
the Baltic Sea region from the larger European security structures. These
concerns determine Finland’s regional strategy for hard and multilateral
cooperation in the region. Finland’s regional strategy appears as generally
cautious, with a concentration upon the country’s close environment. The
emphasis on military means as a foreign policy instrument is played down in
this particular context, relative to the emphasis that is laid on cooperation in
non-military sectors. Military cooperation has, however, both a regional aim
of securing Finland's southern coast, and a more overall aim of
multilateralised relations.
Sweden’s regional ambitions appear as more modest than those of
Denmark, mainly aiming at the stabilisation of the Eastern Baltic Sea.
Together with the inclusive attitude to Russia, Sweden’s stakes in regional
multilateral cooperation have increased relative to military security solutions.
A major demonstration of this was the Swedish government’s initiative to
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intergovernmental and supranational institutions has followed subsequently.
This fits well into the government’s preference for multilateralised relations
also in the security political field. Not that “hard” security is seen as inferior
to regional cooperation, but rather that Sweden’s strategic position currently
speaks for more multilateralised frameworks for its security in the region.
While still lacking any significant group of spokesmen within NATO for full
membership in the alliance, a pattern common to the Baltic states seems
presently to be to rely on future EU membership, Nordic cooperation and a
bilateral understanding with the US as a combined basis for security. From
the actions they have taken throughout the 90’s, it would be fair to describe
their perspectives as, paradoxically, fully on the Atlantic dimension, while
their currently most viable possibilities are found in the regional and
European multilateral cooperation context.
The discussion undertaken in this section indicates that the security political
priorities of the regional states in many ways differ with respect to all three
approaches to security. The relationship between priorities and principal
approaches are shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Security political priorities as related to three approaches
to regional security










Active player in regional
security, linking to
transatlantic security.


































Integration with the Nordic
states (exc. Lithuania)
Tables 1 and 2 indicate two distinct tendencies. First, Finland and Sweden
largely seem to converge over commitment to multilateralisation of regional
security related affairs. Secondly, Denmark and Norway tend to converge
over alliance commitment in military security affairs, and over commitment to
the EU and regional cooperation. These two tendencies transcend the three
approaches to regional security. The perspective of the Baltic states largely
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the Western alliance for their security.
Crossing the two main tendencies, there is a variety of converging and
diverging priorities, which pay different regard to the significance of the US.
While, for example, it is important to Denmark as a basis for national
security policies in the region, for Norway the US is more important as a
guarantor of direct security than as a partner or support in regional politics.
An attempt to explain this pattern of convergence and divergence, will be
made in the following.
6. Conv erging and d iv erg ing perspect iv es  on the
s ignif icance of  the US
Whereas there are notable differences between the perspectives held by the
regional states, there are also important points of convergence, for example
on cooperative security as a commonly shared priority with regard to
attaining regional military security (perhaps with the exception of Norway). It
may be somewhat surprising that even in a situation in which the Baltic Sea
Region at the time is to a large extent relieved of divisions in great power
interest spheres, and in which the regional states seem to share the
perception that the US is wanted as a provider of regional security,
differences occur with respect to its significance in this capacity.
In light of this, the last issue to be addressed will be some factors that may
account for the converging and diverging perspectives that have been
observed. There are three factors that account for converging perspectives
across the board:
Russ ia as  t he main po t ent ial  t h r eat  t o  r eg ional  secur i t y
and s t ab i l i t y
This perception of Russia appears to be shared by the governments of all
the regional states. However, their individual perception of to which degree
and in what respect Russia constitutes for them respectively, may differ
somewhat. In some cases, the emphasis is on Russia as a traditional
assertive great power, which at any given time could begin to conduct
aggressive policies. In other cases, the trouble that may arise out of a
destabilised, dissolving Russian state is emphasised. All states share both
threat perceptions, but emphasise them differently.
What seems to strongest account for such divergence, is their respective
post-cold war strategic situation. Divergence on this issue may quickly lead
to diverging perspectives on the US. On the other hand, Russia as a general
security problem, and also as the major security problem, creates the basic
assumption which is shared by all the states in question, namely that the US
necessarily must be involved in regional security.
Only  t he US is  capab le o f  p ro jec t ing  power  in  t he en t i r e
reg ion
Ensuring the engagement of a US that is capable of balancing the two land
powers Russia and Germany appears as a basic priority for the
governments of all the states in question. Such a counterbalancing role
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not all the regional states themselves strive for full NATO membership, it
appears as if leadership in the alliance well makes up for a certain regional
responsibility.
The US is the only power capable of projecting power that may cause
Russia to abstain from possible pursuance of its geopolitical interest policies
in the region. In the present situation, the lack of such a power could move
the balance in favour of the “German land power”. As a global power, the US
is capable to balance Germany through the alliance. Consequently, alliance
membership for regional states provides for an opportunity to align German
influence through partnership policies with both the land power and the
maritime power.
The reg ion ' s  connec t ion  t o  t he Euro-At lant ic  secur i t y
s t r uc t ure
At present, the region is somewhat three-fourths integrated in the
Euro-Atlantic security structure, most of the states being either fully in the
EU or in NATO, or partly in both. Still lacking is a precisely defined place for
the Baltic States, as well as stable and integrative relations between Russia
and Belarus and the Euro-Atlantic community.
There is a strong concern for all the regional states that the region at least
remains, or even becomes more integrated, in the Western structures. On
this, all the regional states converge. The present transatlantic security
structure provides both for a balance of Russia in the traditional security
political sense, as well as for a confinement of Germany in multilateral
institutions that absorbs German influence. During the last decade, the
growing integration of the region in transatlantic structures has granted most
regional states increased diplomatic freedom of action.
Converging perspectives on these more principal issues, may at the same
time cover up diverging perspectives that may partly have their offspring in
problems connected to the same issues, or to other ones. It is possible to
suggest three such diverging issues:
Russ ia as  a secur i t y  chal lenge
Russia appears to play a role, this time as its character as a challenge to
the security of the regional states is concerned.
Each state’s particular post-Cold War strategic situation accounts for
different views of Russia as a security problem. Sweden and Finland, whose
strategic situation improved greatly during the last decade, have also come
relatively closer up to the area of instability adjacent to Russia’s border in
the region. For them, it is the presence of the US as an actor in regional
security that is important, rather than the US as a direct guarantor. Their
closeness to Russia and their somewhat equal emphasis on Russia as a
stability threat and a potential offensive threat accounts for that. In relation
to the basic security concerns of Finland and Sweden, the US works best
when engaged in regional affairs, but only as a remote lead nation in the
transatlantic security system.
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Swedish postures. However, the security challenge that Russia raises to
Norway is not primarily located in the Baltic Sea region proper, but further
north, where the relationship is extremely asymmetric. It is therefore in
Norway’s interest that the US offers a credible security guarantee. Related
to the Baltic Sea region proper, the Norwegian perspective resembles more
the Finnish and Swedish, seeing further integration of the region in the
transatlantic security structure as the preferred development.
Special cases are Denmark and the Baltic States. The improvement of
Denmark’s strategic position made it more relevant to stress the stability
aspect of Russia, and thus seek security from the US in connection with the
improvement of Denmark’s position in regional security politics. The Baltic
States’ strong urge for direct US guarantees implies a wish for the USA to
enter into regional security as an active player.
NATO’s  eas t ward  expans ion
This issue seems to create the same pattern of divergence as the former.
While somewhat problematic for Sweden and Finland, the eastward
expansion of the alliance improves Denmark’s immediate strategic situation.
On the other hand, it also creates a stronger German element in regional
security, thus increasing the need for Denmark to maintain a close
partnership with the US. Close ties with the US are, likewise, important in
relation to basic Norwegian concerns. The issue at stake in this case is,
however, to maintain the attention of the alliance to Norway’s particular
security problems in the North. Among the Baltic states, Lithuania has begun
to become oriented more towards Poland and Germany. Estonia and Latvia
thus become even more peripheral to NATO, a development that indicates a
pattern of stronger Lithuanian reliance on the Central European component
of NATO, and stronger Estonian/Latvian strive for direct protection from the
USA.
Nat ional  ambit ions  f o r  r eg ional  secur i t y
As discussed above, these concerns tend to separate Denmark, Sweden
and Finland, Norway and the three Baltic states respectively. For Denmark,
US support for its regional security strategies is essential. For Finland,
Norway and Sweden it is, in comparison, sufficient that the US remains a
partner, though a distant one, in regional security. As for the Baltic states,
their ambitions to become Western allies seems to require a more direct role
for the US as a lead actor in regional security. The kind of protection sought
by the governments of these states implies a readiness on the part of the US
to interfere directly on their behalf in case the perceived Russian threat
should materialise.
7. Conc lus ions
Also under the present conditions of low levels of threat and strong common
cooperation processes, it has been possible to observe clearly diverging
security political orientations between the regional states. In other respects,
views converge, thus working to moderate differences. However, the picture
of converging and diverging orientations is not entirely clear. It becomes
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being most notably in Finland and Sweden, as well as continuing changes in
important elements of the overall security structure. Perspectives seem to
converge with regard to US attention to the region and active engagement in
regional affairs as necessary for regional security. Likewise, there seems to
be agreement that a US conviction that the region remains linked to the
Euro-Atlantic security structures, is being upheld.
It is when each states’ individual purpose of US presence for its own security
is concerned, that divergences begin to arise. In particular, it appears as if
the states’ strategic situation as related to Russia and NATO in different
ways create the basic preconditions. After 1990, these factors also seem to
have provided the main ground for the formulation of each state’s particular
security political ambitions, as well as for the emphasis they put on military
security in the traditional sense, respectively broader multilateral
cooperation.
Concerning the countries separately, there is a certain pattern of divergence.
The way Danish perceptions have been formed, the US is demanded both as
a provider of direct security as well as a politico-military support for its own
regional security policies, while Finnish and Swedish concerns go in the
direction of regional presence of the US rather than direct guarantees to
themselves. In the Norwegian perspective and in those of the Baltic States,
especially Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, US presence tends to be
demanded for the purpose of direct security, however on considerably
different grounds.
The analysis that has been undertaken indicates that divergences have
continued to persist between the regional states in spite of the new
conditions that emerged after 1990. The end of the Cold War put the
regional states in new strategic situations, in which all demand some kind of
engagement by the US in regional affairs, but in diverging ways in order to
suit their respective needs. Even if the region in post Cold War Europe has
not become subject to firm divisions between the Western maritime powers
and the regional land powers, the preconditions for a common ground for
regional security do not seem fully present. The presence of the Western
maritime powers in Baltic Sea Region outweighs that of the land powers, but
this has not so far led to entirely common security political orientations by
the regional states.
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